

JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : NCRDEF

DATE: 3 May 1977

FROM : ADPL

25X1
SUBJECT: Comments on [redacted] Draft Paper: "The Roles of the
DCI . . ."

1. Our comments on the PRM-11, Task 2 draft report prepared by
Fritz Ermarth are attached.

2. Please provide them to [redacted] as requested. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1
Assistant Director, NSA/CSS
FOR
Policy and Liaison

Incl:
a/s

NSA review completed

This correspondence may be
declassified upon removal of the
inclosures and physical removal
of the caveat notation.



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Subject: NSA Comments on Draft Paper: "The Roles of the DCI . . ." (PRM-11, Task 2) as provided by [redacted] 25X1

1. The following comments on the draft Task 2 paper are provided as requested by [redacted] on 27 April 1977. 25X1

2. In general terms we believe that the paper is instructive. In describing the various roles of the DCI it, in many respects, fairly presents a philosophical description of where the Community is today, highlighting the paramount issues and existing areas of tension. From an editorial standpoint, the paper could probably be condensed considerably without loss of meaning or impact. The paper is also hampered by an attempt to keep it at an undesirably low classification level.

3. One major substantive comment regarding the draft concerns a belief that there is inadequate treatment given to NSA and the U.S. SIGINT System as a whole in the operation of which the DCI's role, as spelled out in NSC Directive, is authoritative and very clear indeed. There should be no debate over the fact that the DCI, through statements of requirements, does "drive" the SIGINT system. SIGINT represents the largest single element of the National Foreign Intelligence Program in terms of both dollars expended and personnel involved. The great value of SIGINT product to national decision makers and tactical field commanders alike is unquestioned. In our view, therefore, in any consideration of the roles of the DCI and the structure of the Intelligence Community which may lead to a restructuring of the Community, it is absolutely essential to have a very specific understanding of how the SIGINT System operates, how and why it was created in its present form, and how it relates to the DCI, SECDEF and other elements of the Government. This task is not accomplished in the current draft.

4. NSA and the SIGINT System are not just like other organizations which are described at various points in the paper as "Defense intelligence production entities." NSA and the SIGINT System represent a unique organizational arrangement that was established by Presidential memorandum in 1952 to be a truly national system operated by the Secretary of Defense, as the SIGINT Executive Agent, as a service of common concern for the entire Government. This special characteristic of NSA, which is applicable in large part to the [redacted] as well, does not, in our view, receive adequate attention in the paper. The important distinction among these activities and what is intended by the phrase "departmental intelligence," which is critical to an accurate appreciation of the DCI's job, is not made in this paper. 25X1

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5. We also believe - and have stated many times - that the SIGINT System provides a useful model for considering some of the broader issues involving the entire Intelligence Community. This System is operated under a single management concept by an Agency whose Director reports in a management sense to the Secretary of Defense but who responds to priorities, requirements and objectives stated by the DCI on behalf of all intelligence users. The system works in peacetime and, we believe, could readily transition into a wartime environment. The "global-local" support example that we apply to SIGINT is a convenient and understandable means of addressing the complex "national-tactical" issue, though we seem to have trouble convincing others of its utility. In short, the SIGINT system represents in many respects a model that can be usefully applied to other forms of intelligence as part of the deliberations and ultimate decision-making in respect to the role of the DCI and the structure of the Intelligence Community.

6. Our specific recommendations to correct what we believe to be a serious deficiency in the paper are as follows:

a. Section I, page 3, add a new sub-para c to read:

"c. As directed in NSCID 6, SECDEF as Executive Agent of the Government for Signals Intelligence, manages as a service of common concern the National Security Agency/Central Security Service which is responsible for responding to intelligence requirements of all agencies and departments within the requirements framework established by the DCI with the advice of NFIB."

b. Section II, page 15, add the following descriptive paragraphs:

"In considering the subject of intelligence structure it is useful to have a basic understanding of the history and operating relationships of NSA and the entire U.S. SIGINT System which comprise by far the largest single segment of the NFIB and which produce intelligence of critical value to a broad spectrum of users including both national decision makers and tactical field commanders.

"The establishment of NSA was directed by President Truman in 1952 in a memorandum in which he also stated that the communications intelligence activities of the United States are a national responsibility and that they must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the

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maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies.

"The President designated the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government for the production of COMINT information and directed that the COMINT mission of NSA shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of COMINT activities of the U.S. and to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto.

"The Director of NSA was specifically charged with the responsibility for conducting COMINT activities as required to meet the needs of the departments and agencies which are authorized to receive COMINT products.

"A key result of the 1952 directive was the consolidation under the single managership of the Director, NSA of the COMINT effort of the U.S. which up to that point had primarily consisted of a loose confederation of military organizations. This arrangement, which existed prior to 1952, had been found to be not well suited in the intensely specialized COMINT field to the elimination of duplication, the intense concentration of available funds, and the flexible assignment of resources to the solution of a problem that must be treated as a whole.

"The unitary, single management structure of the United States SIGINT System as it exists today under the SIGINT control of the Director, NSA has developed in an evolutionary fashion from the philosophy and direction that was provided in 1952. (Signals Intelligence is currently conducted under the provisions of NSC Intelligence Directive No. 6, dated 17 February 1972). The considerations which influenced the original set of decisions to form a unified SIGINT System to perform intelligence activities as a national responsibility of common concern to a wide variety of users and responding to objectives, requirements and priorities issued by the DCI remain valid."

7. Some other substantive comments follow:

- a. Section III, page 54, last paragraph. Believe the role of the DCI in respect to allocation of community resources is

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not accurately described in this portion of the report. The record should indicate that in early 1973 the DCI became Chairman of the EXCOM with a clear understanding on the part of all interested parties as to his dominance. (Prior to 1973, the DCI was one of three members, with the Chairmanship held by the "impartial" President's Scientific Advisor.) The last sentence of this paragraph, in particular, is just not accurate. The DCI did in fact both stimulate activity and cause trades among programs to be accomplished. In short, he controlled the application of intelligence resources through the requirements and priorities mechanism. He clearly could and did "drive" actively and directed trade-offs among competing programs, particularly those involving overhead photo, SIGINT and the [redacted] programs.


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b. Section III, page 83, suggest deleting the last paragraph and replacing with the following which is an accurate description of current arrangements:

"In the case of SIGINT, there is no problem with the statements of the DCI's paramount authority to conduct SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments as set forth in NSCIDs No. 1 and No. 6. These directives clearly and without equivocation establish the basic principle that it is the DCI who is the senior U.S. official in charge of foreign SIGINT relationships.

"The relationship between, and the responsibilities of, the DCI and DIRNSA are further established and defined in DCID 6/2, wherein it is restated that it is the DCI who "establishes policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments."

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8. One particularly troublesome issue that would be most useful to consider in the context of the PRM-11 debate concerns the serious deficiency that exists today in focusing on intelligence support to arms limitation treaty monitoring and verification. This is perhaps the highest priority requirement facing the Intelligence Community today and it should be pursued as a major national task to be emphasized by the DCI. Our observation is that the orchestration of this crucial effort is receiving less than adequate attention. There is no single spokesman for this subject area within the system; there is inadequate involvement of intelligence people in Panel activities; very few stated requirements exist; and there is virtually no meaningful interaction between the policy makers and the Intelligence Community. NFIB involvement has been minimal though potential intelligence contributions are great. This entire subject is of such a critical nature to the United States and our intelligence posture is so relatively poor that it merits inclusion in PRM-11 deliberations as a function that clearly must be emphasized as a principal responsibility of the DCI.

9. Some additional comments are attached.

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Attachment to NSA Comments on Draft Paper:
"The Roles of the DCI . . ." (PRM-11, Task 2)
as provided by [redacted]

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Page 3, paragraph d. After "DoD" add the following text:

"(The National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the [redacted] are the principal DoD foreign intelligence elements.)" 25X1

RATIONALE: To introduce the reader to these special DoD programs early in the narrative.

Page 7, 3d line. Add new final sentence:

"Moreover, a highly specialized intelligence discipline such as SIGINT is better distinguished in terms of global and local when dealing with targets and collection assets."

RATIONALE: To emphasize that the distinctions of national and tactical are not satisfactory for SIGINT.

Page 11, paragraph a. Add new final sentence:

"On the other hand the SIGINT discipline is organized as a national responsibility to maximize finite and costly resources in order to serve effectively all consumers of the government from the President to the tactical commander."

RATIONALE: To balance the sub-paragraph with national as well as departmental examples.

Page 29, final paragraph. Add asterisk after "finished intelligence" and add footnote to bottom of page as follows:

"* The production of finished intelligence involves the process of bringing to bear on a particular subject all of the intelligence available from the various sources, i.e., SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMAGERY as appropriate."

RATIONALE: To advise the reader briefly as to the origin and content of finished intelligence.

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Page 31. Elaborate on the treatment of the SWS.

The SWS receives inadequate attention in the draft.

RATIONALE: A statement as to Community sentiment (or lack of it) for the SWS would be a service to the reader.

Page 34. Change first full sentence to read as follows:

"Yet, for a 'service industry,' some members of the Community are relatively lax in cultivating contacts with consumers."

RATIONALE: NSA does not consider itself lax in this regard. NSA has an active program at many levels to initiate, foster and maintain contacts.

Page 43. Change first sentence of first full paragraph to read as follows:

"By comparison, with imagery, the SIGINT world is more diverse as to target activities, systems and suborganizations involved, but in unique in having a single manager."

RATIONALE: To clarify further the comparison.

Page 62, sub-paragraph c. Change to read as follows:

"c. Varied R&D activities that support the Clandestine Service, analytic elements, imagery collection programs and coordinated ad hoc SIGINT programs."

RATIONALE: To emphasize the uniqueness of these occasional R&D SIGINT activities that must be coordinated with the US SIGINT System manager, the Director, NSA.

Page 78. Add new final sentence as follows:

"Moreover, it should be recalled that the Inspectors General of the respective departments and agencies have other responsibilities and duties beyond those required by E.O. 11905."

RATIONALE: To balance the narrative with the recollection that I.G.s continue to be responsible for the many varied duties they had before the advent of E.O. 11905.

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In conclusion two points of general nature are noted:

a) The classification of the draft at the SECRET level does not appear adequate. Additional caveats would be necessary particularly with regard to the text on page 43 and 100.

b) A detailed treatment of the USIB/NFIB, and the support provided the DCI by these boards would appear warranted as an item appropriate to a study of the roles of the DCI.

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